Real Property by Wilharm, John H. & Shoup, Robert J.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 14 | Issue 3
1963
Real Property
John H. Wilharm Jr.
Robert J. Shoup
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
John H. Wilharm Jr. and Robert J. Shoup, Real Property, 14 W. Res. L. Rev. 464 (1963)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol14/iss3/20
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
breaking into of premises is contrary to public policy and, therefore, void.
Accordingly, it was not a valid defense nor a plea in mitigation to an
action for trespass. The judgment for Hileman was affirmed.
JOSEPH KALK
REAL PROPERTY
GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
Outside of the condemnation area, one Ohio Supreme Court case re-
ported in 1962 is worthy of mention. In Manpower, Inc. v. Oakley
Drive-In Theatre, Inc.1 the court drew a distinction between laboring
upon defendant's project and furnishing labor for it. Plaintiff furnished
laborers to work on defendant's building under a contract with defend-
ant's prime contractor, Phillips. Plaintiff was not paid, although it paid
all its employees. Subsequently it caused a mechanics lien to be filed
against defendant's property and in this case sought foreclosure. The
issue concerning the court was whether a contractor who furnished la-
borers for a project has any lien rights against the property improved
under Ohio Revised Code section 1311.02. The court decided that plain-
tiff did not have any such lien rights. The court first determined that,
according to the statutory definition or a judicial description, plaintiff
could not qualify as a subcontractor. Further, it found that plaintiff was
not a laborer. Therefore, it could not qualify for lien rights under Ohio
Revised Code section 1311.02 which states that "every person who as a
subcontractor, laborer, or materialman... has a lien... ."2
Mclnnish v. Sibit,3 a case involving a common fact situation, decided
ten years ago, was finally reported in 1962. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin
defendant from using a portion of their property as his driveway. Plain-
tiffs unquestionably had title to the property. However, defendant
sought to establish his right on the basis of a prescriptive easement.
Clearly the claimant to such an easement has the burden of proof to es-
tablish such an easement. The court had no trouble with this proposi-
tion, but it did find a lack of Ohio authority on the degree of proof
necessary. After examining Ohio case law and authorities from other
jurisdictions on the issue, the court concluded that one endeavoring to
prove a prescriptive easement must do so by dear and convincing evi-
dence. In the case at bar, the court held that there was "no dear show-
1. 173 Ohio St. 45, 179 N.E.2d 922 (1962).
2. Id. at 47, 179 N.E.2d at 924.
3. 114 Ohio App. 490, 183 N.E.2d 237 (1953).
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ing" that defendant and his predecessors in tide had openly and continu-
ously used the drive for a period long enough to establish an easement by
prescription.
The effect of a restrictive covenant limiting lots to "residence pur-
poses only" was the primary issue in Swineford v. Nichols.4 The action
was for a permanent injunction to restrain defendants from using a part
of their home as a commercial beauty parlor. All deeds covering the
allotment, including defendants', contained the restriction, "said premises
shall be used for residence purposes only."5  Furthermore, there was no
question that defendant Margaret A. Nichols was a licensed cosmetolo-
gist, had a shop license for the practice of this vocation, and had obtained
a permit from the Zoning Board of Appeals. The court assumed that
the permit issued by the Zoning Board of Appeals was valid and dealt
only with the issue of the deed restriction.
The court indulged in a detailed examination of the facts and found,
inter alia, that defendants had a single family residence, which had not
been altered in appearance and did not have a commercial front. The
court found that the commercial activities were confined to one room
(formerly a "family room") and that there was no parking problem or
annoyance to the neighbors. The court stated that there was no substan-
tial evidence that the operation had depreciated the property in the allot-
ment. The court concluded that defendants had not violated the deed
restriction except for the advertising they had undertaken. The defend-
ants were allowed to continue their operation. However, they were en-
joined from advertising or expanding such operation and from employ-
ing persons not residents of the household.
An opinion from the Common Pleas Court of Tuscarawas County,
McCullough v. D. Waldenmeyer, Inc.,6 deserves note. The measure of
damages for the breach by the vendor of a contract to sell real estate was
the major issue in the McCullough case. Plaintiffs sought damages for
defendant's failure to complete a contract for the purchase of a home to
be constructed by defendant. The plaintiffs' evidence showed their liqui-
dated damages as a down payment of $1,585.00, interest on it of $110.00,
telephone installation of $15.00, loss of the bargain of $215.00, and in-
terest of approximately $10.00. These items total $1,935.00, and the
jury verdict was $2,650.00, or $715.00 more than the damages shown
by the evidence. The question for the court, on a motion for a new trial,
was whether the measure of damages in such a case would support this
award of $715.00 over the amounts proved. The court, relying on some
Ohio authority and a decision of the Supreme Court of Washington, held
4. 177 N.E.2d 304 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
5. Id. at 306.
6. 185 N.E.2d 806 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
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that the jury, having been properly instructed, could award damages to
plaintiffs for their "loss of time" in discharging their obligations under
the contract without specific evidence of the value of the time.
Werner v. Guttman' was a suit between the owner of the fee and the
holders of two ninety-nine year leases, renewable forever. The court was
requested to determine which party was entitled to an $11,000.00 fire in-
surance payment. The lessees paid a ground rent and were required, by
the terms of each lease, to maintain fire insurance. A fire partially de-
stroyed a building and the insurance carrier paid the $11,000.00 to the
lessees. Following this payment, the property was condemned by the
state, and the parties agreed to a distribution of the award as between the
fee holder and the lessees.
The court in determining who was entitled to the fire insurance pro-
ceeds, had to consider the interests of the parties. It found that the own-
ers of the fee are in the position of a mortgagee and the insurance is in
the nature of security for their rent. Furthermore, the owner is entitled
to receive his rent, and nothing more. In this case, the fee holder re-
ceived a sum representing his rents, as capitalized, from the condemnation
proceeds. Therefore, the court held, he had been compensated for his
property interest and the benefits of the security, i.e., the insurance would
accrue to the lessees.
The Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, in Munn v. Horvitz,8
decided an important case involving drainage rights. Plaintiffs in the
Munn case were residents of an area which the court described as the
"Deer Creek Watershed." They sought to enjoin construction of a new
large sewer system in their area. Plaintiffs alleged that there was an un-
natural diversion of surface waters into their watershed and a consequen-
tial unnatural discharge of this water which caused damage to their prop-
erty. There was evidence that this unnatural diversion had existed for
some years prior to the construction of the new sewer. The court found
that because of this use for years before, and even if there had been a
diversion from one watershed to another, the municipal corporations in-
volved acquired a prescriptive right to continue this use and the right to
make necessary improvements (in this case expansion) in such a drain-
age system. The court denied plaintiffs' request to enjoin further con-
struction of the sewer.
APPROPRIATION CASES
Significant cases continue to be decided by Ohio courts in the field of
eminent domain. Several cases should be brought to the readers' attention.
7. 113 Ohio App. 553, 175 N.E.2d 114 (1959).
8. 184 N.E.2d 231 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962). See also Wilharm, Survey of Ohio Law - Real
Property, 12 W. REs. L. REV. 546, 549 (1961).
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In two cases9 the Ohio Supreme Court held that an agency of the
state had the power to purchase or condemn private property to provide
an access road to other private property which had become landlocked as
a result of construction of a turnpike or creation of a limited access high-
way. In the May case the court held that Ohio Revised Code section
5537.01 gave the defendant Turnpike Commission authority for such an
acquisition. It further held that such a taking was a public use and there-
fore not violative of article I, section 19 of the Ohio Constitution. The
court in the Tracey case found that the Director of Highways had author-
ity by virtue of Ohio Revised Code section 5511.02 to appropriate land
for such a purpose.
In In re Appropriation of Easements for Highway Purposes"0 the su-
preme court settled a conflict between two courts of appeals upon an im-
portant procedural matter. In this appropriation case the landowners
filed a motion in the common pleas court for an extension of time and
for leave to file an appeal. This motion was filed after the time pre-
scribed by statute had elapsed. The common pleas court granted the mo-
tion and the appeal was filed. After the Director of Highways' motion
to dismiss was overruled, he appealed and the court of appeals ordered
the common pleas court to dismiss the appeal. This decision was in con-
flict with an earlier case,'1 and the supreme court resolved the question.
That court held that the time allowed by statute for a landowner to file
an "appeal" to common pleas court was a statute of limitations and com-
pliance with it was mandatory in order to vest jurisdiction in the court.
Two points were raised in In re Appropriation for Highway Pur-
poses. 2 The trial court sustained an objection to a question by counsel
for the state upon voir dire as to whether the fact that the award would
come from public funds would affect the amount the prospective juror
would consider. Counsel was instructed to refrain from questions of this
type. The court, after considering the entire voir dire, found that there
had been no abuse of discretion. The court further held that the trial
court may limit questions touching upon the fact that the sum to be paid
by the state will come from tax revenues as an attempt to appeal to jurors'
self-interest.
The court approved of a charge which allowed the jury to consider
the cost of reproducing the building less depreciation, but also advised
them that this was not fair market value which they had to determine.
The matter of jurors taking notes of the testimony of expert witnesses
was thoroughly examined in In re Appropriation of Easements for High-
9. May v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n, 172 Ohio St. 555, 178 N.E.2d 920 (1962); Tracey v.
Preston, 172 Ohio St. 567, 178 N.E.2d 923 (1962).
10. 172 Ohio St. 338, 175 NX.E.2d 512 (1961).
11. In re Appropriation for Highway Purposes, 104 Ohio App. 243, 148 N.E.2d 242 (1957).
12. 187 N.E. 2d 413 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962).
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way Purposes." On a motion for a new trial the court held that under
the facts of this case, and in the absence of a showing that a party had
been prejudiced, it was not error to permit the jurors to take notes on
the valuation of lands and buildings. Appellants had requested that the
jury be permitted to take notes. The court permitted this and instructed
the jury that it was only to take notes as to the values of the property. The
court went through an extensive examination of the Ohio cases touching
on this point and also discussed several cases from other jurisdictions.
Furthermore, it noted that in an appropriation case there is no burden of
proof and no issue save the amount to be paid appellant. Considering
these aspects of the case, the court found that this matter was within the
trial court's discretion. In the absence of a showing of prejudice, the
procedure would be permitted.
The question of who can "appeal" to a common pleas court for a
jury trial pursuant to Ohio Revised Code section 5519.02 came before
the court of appeals in In re Appropriation of Easement for Highway
Purposes.4 The lessee had filed such an "appeal." The common pleas
court held that the lessee had no separate appealable interest and dis-
missed the "appeal." The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal holding
that a lessee was not an "owner" under the statutes. The principal rea-
son for this is that the question to be determined in such an "appeal" is
the value of the real estate as a whole. The distribution of the award
between the owner of the fee and any lessees is of no import nor concern
to the State or the courts.
In an unreported case, a court of appeals held that an award some-
what lower than the state's lowest testimony could stand and that it was
within the trial court's discretion whether to grant a new trial. The ap-
peal of right was dismissed by the Ohio Supreme Court on the ground
that no debatable constitutional question was presented."
JOHN H. WILHARM, JR.
ROBERT J. SHOUP
13. 176 N.E.2d 881 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
14. 115 Ohio App. 48, 184 N.E.2d 256 (1961).
15. In re Appropriation of Easement for Highway Purposes, 172 Ohio St. 540, 179 N.E.2d
47 (1961). The Editor's note following the opinion in 18 OHIO OP. 2d 85 contains the facts
of the case as reported in this article.
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